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In a dream I saw the Sun soaring over the earth, fleeing from the north, 
followed by dreadful clouds. In its flight it passed me by and disappeared 
from sight, allowing darkness to cover all places along the coast. Large 
scores of Northmen are coming, bringing war and unimaginable destruction 
with them, leaving this friendly land bereft of life.1 
FOREBODING prophecies like this one, attributed to early-ninth-century 
Frisian missionary Liudger, reflect worried attitudes apparent in numerous 
contemporary ecclesiastical sources from north-western Europe. Like many 
other areas surrounding the North Sea, Frisia was repeatedly overwhelmed 
by foreign marauders during the ninth century. As elsewhere, these attacks 
were largely opportunistic in nature, focusing exclusively on wealthy and 
vulnerable targets. One such target was Dorestad, a thriving focal point of 
interregional trade situated on a junction of several rivers, constituting 
Frisia’s foremost commercial centre up to the mid-ninth century. The later 
ninth century, however, witnessed a reversal in Dorestad’s fortunes as the 
settlement declined and disappeared within several decades. Systematic 
archaeological excavation at the site began during the 1960s and covered an 
area of over thirty-five hectares, providing physical insights into Dorestad’s 
origins, pinnacle and ultimate decline.2 Substantial amounts of research 
have since increasingly unearthed the settlement’s cultural, political and 
* Christian is a PhD Candidate at the University of Edinburgh, where his current research 
focuses on the politico-economic contextualisation of Viking activity within the Low 
Countries.
1 Translated by the author from Sint Liudger, 15.
2 Van Es and Verwers 2009, 9-13; Willemsen 2012, 66. 
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commercial role on the edge of the Frankish realm.3 Several hypotheses 
regarding Dorestad’s eventual disappearance have been put forward, the 
most popular of which exclusively blames destructive Viking incursions. 
However, no explanation has thus far proven itself to be wholly sustainable. 
This paper will re-examine these theories before presenting an alternative, in 
which a framework of cultural, political and economic factors is considered to 
explain the settlement’s gradual decline.
The Beginning of the End
Before becoming subject to Viking aggression during the 830s, Dorestad 
peerlessly dominated Frisia’s commercial landscape, serving as a gateway 
between the Carolingian Rhinelands, Anglo-Saxon England and the 
Scandinavian north.4 With innumerable merchants exchanging goods, silver 
and ideas at the emporium, its wealth and prestige made it a prime target of 
Viking incursion. The initial attack of 834, recorded in the Annales Bertiniani, 
began as
[…] a fleet of Danes came to Frisia and laid waste a part of it. From there, 
they came by way of Utrecht to the emporium called Dorestad and destroyed 
everything. They slaughtered some people, took others away captive, and 
burned the surrounding region.5
The settlement appears to have lacked most defensive capabilities, 
leaving it unprepared and overwhelmed by Danish invaders.6 The incursion 
probably yielded a significant pay-off, as the annals indicate that Vikings 
returned no fewer than three times during the three subsequent summers, 
when they ‘devastated Dorestad and Frisia’.7
3 Most prominent is the work of Wim van Es, who has published on Dorestad’s archaeological 
aspects for over thirty years, and Simon Coupland, who has extensively mapped and 
interpreted the settlement’s numismatic output. Van Es 1990, 151-153; Coupland 2010, 95-96
4 Local archaeological evidence indicates that Rhenish pottery, which had for centuries 
made its way north-west through the Low Countries, was still abundantly present in 
the emporium at this time. See Van Es and Verwers 1994, 184-186. In addition, numerous 
finds of the locally-issued ‘temple’-coinage of Louis the Pious (820s-830s) indicate wide 
distribution patterns across northern Europe, see Coupland 2010, 97. Ninth-century 
imitations of this coinage, minted at Haithabu and Ribe, specifically denote Dorestad’s 
continued economic influence in Scandinavia, seemingly unaffected by the initial Danish 
attack on Frisia that took place in 810. Malmer 2007, 22.
5 Annals of St-Bertin, 30.
6 Although Dorestad may have originally developed from an earlier settlement surrounding 
the former Roman castellum Levefanum, it is debatable whether the fort itself was still 
being used for defensive purposes following the fifth century. See Van Es and Verwers 
2010, 19-20. 
7 Annals of St-Bertin, 35. After the 837 attack, Dorestad remained a prominent target; the 
annals indicate that Scandinavians set out for another strike during the following year, 
only to be thwarted by disastrous weather. Annals of St-Bertin, 39.
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Intermittent rebuilding efforts could not prevent a subsequent decline 
in local commerce during the 840s. Reduced finds of mid-ninth-century 
coins from the emporium, representing a waning silver influx, indicate that 
this decline was gradual, taking several decades to extinguish Dorestad’s 
commercial liveliness.8 Frisian merchants were still frequenting the site 
during this period, and it is speculated that Carolingian coinage looted by 
Vikings may have subsequently returned into circulation through friendly 
exchanges at the emporium.9 Emperor Lothar, like his father Louis the Pious, 
still issued coinage at Dorestad’s official Carolingian mint during the 840s, 
albeit in significantly reduced amounts.10 
Annalistic sources indicate that the Danes then held sway over Dorestad 
from around 850, apparently having been granted the area as a benefice for 
their service to Lothar and his brothers in their rebellion against Louis.11 The 
settlement’s already deteriorating economy did not seem to benefit from 
Danish authority, as more and more merchants appear to have abandoned 
Dorestad for better prospects elsewhere.12 The historical record is silent 
following a final Scandinavian attack on Dorestad in 863, its fate during the 
late 860s and 870s still subject to speculation. The complete absence of coinage 
of Lothar II and Charles the Bald, the dominant legal tender for most of this 
period, suggests the discontinuation of all economic activity at the site.13
A number of principal causes or a combination thereof have been 
theorised to have led to the decline and eventual downfall of Dorestad as a 
supraregional port of commerce. Most popularly and widely named as the 
main and often only cause of the emporium’s demise are the Viking attacks 
of the 830s and subsequent attacks up to 863. Numerous scholars assert 
8 Coupland 2010, 96.
9 Willemsen 2004, 74.
10 Coupland 2002, 226.
11 The notion of Frisian raids serving as an apparatus of internal Carolingian hostility is 
provided by the Annales Bertiniani, in which Lothar is described as conspiring with the 
Danes to ‘damage [his] father’s interests and the furtherance of his own’. See Annals of 
St-Bertin, 51. Nithard’s Historiae (840s) corroborates these events, describing Lothar calling 
upon ‘the Norsemen to help him’ and allowing them to plunder and rule over Christians. 
See Frankish Annals, 167. This intra-dynastic conflict was not resolved until the Treaty of 
Verdun of 843 carved up the Empire into three separate kingdoms.
12 Van Es and Verwers 1980, 299. The Danish occupation itself left few traces at Dorestad; even 
the limited amount of objects possibly attributable to Scandinavian rulers, predominantly 
jewellery and weaponry, may just as well have reached Dorestad through earlier trade. For 
a description of the objects, see Willemsen 2004, 66-74.
13 Coupland 2010, 97. Van Es suggests that the emporium had been reduced to an agrarian 
settlement of limited significance by the late-ninth century (See Van Es 1994, 115). An 
Ottonian charter from 948, renewing the possessions of the Utrecht bishopric, includes 
Dorestad as a villa ‘now called Wijk’, a name it retained ever since. See Oorkondenboek Sticht 
Utrecht, 115.
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that Dorestad’s potent economic infrastructure, the result of centuries of 
intermediate trade between the Rhinelands and the North Sea Region, was 
entirely disrupted by the Scandinavian episode.14 These authors refer mainly 
to the annalistic corpus in support of their assessments, but often disregard 
these monastic sources’ hyperbolic tendencies to disfavour the Danes as an 
uncivilised people that ‘worshipped demons’.15 Instead, it is feasible that the 
returned attacks on the emporium in fact imply that it was repeatedly rebuilt 
and in continuous operation despite slowly depreciating economically.
Other scholars point to different reasons for Dorestad’s decline: as little 
archaeological evidence of destruction layers has been found, it has been 
argued that the movements of the adjacent Crooked Rhine were ultimately 
responsible for the emporium’s downfall.16 The river seems to have steadily 
shifted eastwards throughout the settlement’s lifespan, and is thought to have 
moved as much as 200 metres by the late-ninth century.17 Several phases of 
causeway construction, bridging the increasing distance between navigable 
water and solid ground over the former riverbed, have been identified during 
the 1970s. These structures, either jetties or dams made of wood and earth, 
may have additionally supported both dwellings and workshops.18 Although 
the exact speed of the river’s retreat is difficult to determine, merchants would 
have had little trouble reaching Dorestad’s harbour during the ninth century, 
landing their vessels on the beach near causeway termini.19
A third and somewhat more ambiguous cause has by some been 
identified as the political turmoil within the Carolingian Empire during 
most of the ninth century. Imperial disorder would have adversely affected 
Frankish influence and defensive capabilities, a situation subsequently taken 
advantage of by prospective claimants to the throne and foreign invaders 
alike.20 Simon Coupland suggests that the division of the Empire into separate 
kingdoms may have also broken down economic links, causing the otherwise 
uniform flow of silver to be interrupted.21 Although these circumstances may 
certainly have affected Dorestad, they could not have been detrimental to its 
functioning, as any economic downturn would have hit other regional emporia 
in a similar fashion. However, this turns out not to have been the case. In fact, 
14 Heidinga 1997, 24; Milis 2006, 10, 16.
15 Annals of St-Bertin, 51.
16 Van Es 1994, 116. Comparisons have also been made between Dorestad’s decline and that 
of Quentovic, its contemporary counterpart on the English Channel, which seems to have 
disappeared a century afterwards through environmental changes, see Forte 2005, 60.
17 Verwers 2010, 69.
18 Van Es and Verwers 2009, 61-62, 340-341.
19 Kalmring 2010, 72-73.
20 Eickhoff 2004, 64.
21 Coupland 2010, 103. 
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the mid-to-late-ninth century is characterised by periods of economic growth 
for nearby trading settlements like Deventer and more distant Quentovic.22
None of the theories above have thus far been able to provide an 
altogether sustainable explanation for Dorestad’s descent into obscurity. The 
continued operation of the emporium following each incursion indicates that 
the attacks did not severely impair on-going efforts to restore its commercial 
prominence. In addition, neither the shifting of the Crooked Rhine nor any 
internal Carolingian strife would have presented a terminal spanner in 
Dorestad’s works. These dominant theories should therefore not be regarded 
as decisive, but merely contributing factors within a more elaborate scheme of 
local economic decline. The following narrative takes a step back to examine 
this framework, whose circumstances, both accidental and predetermined, 
would eventually drain Dorestad of its economic potential. 
An Alternative Theory
Following the Dorestad raids of 834-37, Louis the Pious ordered the 
organisation of extensive defensive measures throughout Frisia, so that ‘the 
[Danish] savagery and our men’s fecklessness might now be avoided’.23 
Historical sources seem to point to the subsequent fortification of existing 
inland settlements like Maastricht and Nijmegen, both riverside towns likely 
encompassing prominent Carolingian markets.24 Yet no such fortifications are 
evident in Dorestad. Even though the emporium held neither episcopal seat 
nor royal residence, its continued commercial prominence and favourable 
location must have still made it a valuable asset to the Carolingians. However, 
as the settlement at the time stretched several kilometres along the Crooked 
Rhine, any major defensive precautions would have been deeply problematic 
to implement.25 Such a realisation may have prompted the Carolingians to 
allocate their resources elsewhere, lowering Dorestad’s priority as a target 
worth defending. In turn, this may have dissuaded many Frisian merchants, 
fearing for their safety and merchandise, from visiting the settlement. 
Regardless, its commercial potential must have still been acknowledged; 
Lothar, despite having possibly encouraged raiding on Dorestad during the 
22 Päffgen 2004, 94; Coupland 2002, 227.
23 Annals of St-Bertin, 37.
24 Leupen 1996, 88-90.
25 When harbour development peaked, around 825, Dorestad accommodated over a kilometre 
of densely packed storehouses along the Crooked Rhine. Further buildings are speculated 
to have lined the river for several more kilometres around this area, beyond the scope of 
current excavation. A similar but smaller harbour complex on both the Rivers Lek and 
Rhine, at the south of the settlement, is also speculated to have existed despite lacking 
evidence due to erosion. See McCormick 2001, 653; Van Es 1990, 162.
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830s, continued issuing official Carolingian coinage from the emporium’s mint 
during his rule.26 
The incoming Danes, led by their chieftain Rorik, would have become 
rulers of an already commercially weakened Dorestad.27 As such, relinquishing 
direct control over it would not have been a considerable economic risk 
for Lothar.28 In fact, the Danish benefice may have provided considerable 
advantages for the Carolingians, meriting such a bestowal. First of all, the 
establishment of a fiefdom would pacify the Danish aggressors, integrating 
them into a defined and controlled administrative hierarchy which bound 
them to specific defensive obligations. According to the Annales Fuldenses, 
Rorik was required to ‘resist piratical attacks of the [other] Danes’.29 This 
allowed Lothar to turn local military administration into a delegated task, 
protecting both Dorestad and the Carolingian heartlands upstream. As these 
hinterlands harboured some of the most influential political, ecclesiastical 
and commercial centres of the Middle Kingdom and East Francia, having 
the river well-defended from Viking marauders would have been in the 
Carolingians’ best interests.30 But where an imperial presence did not seem 
to prevent Vikings from raiding, Danish imperial vassals were a far more 
effective deterrent. In fact, only two significant Viking expeditions are known 
to have taken place in the Rhinelands during Rorik’s twenty-odd year rule: 
one in 857, in the Dane’s absence, and one in 863, for which he was swiftly 
reprimanded by ecclesiastical authorities.31 Far fewer attacks took place 
when Rorik ruled than before or after this period, which made his presence 
highly advantageous to the Carolingians.32 The end of Rorik’s rule during 
the late 870s or early 880s clearly illustrates this significance, as the Rhenish 
heartlands once again seemed accessible to numerous bands of Scandinavian 
26 Coupland 2001, 189-190. See also note 4. 
27 The exact extent of this benefice remains unknown. For a discussion, see Coupland 1998, 
97
28 Coupland 1998, 96.
29 Annals of Fulda, 30.
30 Several contemporary royal palaces, kaiserpfalzen, had been established near the Rhine 
or its tributary rivers and could be found at Nijmegen (less than forty kilometres from 
Dorestad), Duisburg, Ingelheim and, most importantly, Aachen. Numerous trade 
settlements dealing in local commodities could also be found near the Rhenish river banks. 
Likewise, prominent imperial monasteries at Xanten, Lorsch and St. Goar, which enclosed 
specialised production facilities and local markets, were also present here. See Costambeys 
et al. 2011, 77; McCormick 2001, 664; Himstedt 2004, 32; Päffgen 2004, 104.
31 A letter from Bishop Hincmar of Reims to Bishop Hunger of Utrecht criticises Rorik for his 
involvement in a Viking campaign in the Carolingian heartlands, which multiple annals 
confirm was carried out by Danish raiders ‘follow[ing] Rorik’s advice’, possibly steering 
them clear of Dorestad. See Annals of St-Bertin, 104; Annales Xantenses, 21; Coupland 1998, 
98.
32 Coupland 1998, 101. 
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raiders. The year 881 witnessed unprecedented destruction in Cologne and 
Bonn, with their inhabitants driven out as churches were set alight. Similarly, 
the annals lament an attack on Aachen, where the Northmen apparently ‘used 
the king’s chapel as a stable for their horses’.33
Apart from its military advantages, the Danish benefice also ensured 
the continuation of Carolingian authority over the region, albeit less directly 
involved. In theory, this would imply that Frisian and Frankish merchants 
would still be equally able to conduct business in Dorestad. It would also 
have been possible for royal officials to remain partially active in Danish-held 
Dorestad, securing the Carolingians’ local fiscal and judicial interests.34 The 
Annales Fuldenses confirm that Rorik received the benefice ‘on condition that 
he would faithfully handle the taxes and other matters pertaining to the royal 
fisc’, which guaranteed a continued local income for Carolingian rulers.35 A 
charter issued by Louis the Pious in 815 granted a decima, a tenth of taxes and 
tolls generated through production and trade at Dorestad, to the episcopal seat 
in nearby Utrecht.36 This practice may well have continued into the 850s, and 
it is likely that the emporium would have accommodated a clerical presence 
until at least 857, when Utrecht itself was attacked.
Having secured continued access to Dorestad, local tax income and the 
region’s defence against further incursion, granting the emporium to Danish 
rulers may have been a less worrisome development than the annals indicate. 
It may even have been wholly premeditated, part of a more elaborate design to 
ensure a continued Carolingian presence and influence within Frisia. Because 
such a design may have been commercially motivated in part, it may also 
have anticipated the continued economic decline and eventual disappearance 
of Dorestad itself, as discussed below.
A number of Frisian trade settlements, economically similar to Dorestad 
but nowhere near as sizeable, had developed along the Frisian rivers during the 
eighth and ninth centuries, serving as commercial outlets for their respective 
catchment areas and relay stations for cargo to or from Dorestad.37 This 
regional network of settlements included Deventer on the River IJssel and Tiel 
on the River Waal.38 Archaeological evidence from both settlements indicates 
33 Annals of Fulda, 90. Comparable havoc was wreaked in the following years in Trier, 
Duisburg and Neuss. Päffgen 2004, 93, 99.
34 Van Es 1990, 179.
35 Annals of Fulda, 30.
36 Diplomata Belgica, 315-316.
37 Lebecq 1992, 14.
38 The early-tenth-century Vita Lebuini suggests that Deventer developed around a wooden 
church established on the IJssel around 770 by Saint Lebuinis. “Vita Lebuini Antiqua”, 792. 
Archaeological evidence suggests similar agglomeration around St. Martin’s Church in 
Tiel. Sarfatij 1999, 268.
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a steadily growing import of Rhenish ceramics from the mid-ninth century.39 
Finds of Carolingian coins, balances and metal weights, in addition, suggest 
the establishment of contemporary local markets.40 Pim Verwers indicates 
that this archaeological corpus denotes a gradual adoption of Dorestad’s 
former economic prominence.41 Despite the relatively compliant nature of 
the emporium’s Danish vassalage, Frisian merchants still seem to have moved 
their business towards less perilous alternatives.42 As a result, Deventer and 
Tiel, which had presented no threat to Dorestad before, now gradually began 
to overtake the emporium commercially.43 
The simultaneous growth and decline of these respective settlements 
need not by itself be taken as proof of Carolingian intervention. The notion that 
Tiel and Deventer were in all likelihood located outside the Danish benefice, 
however, might be. The IJssel region, which included Deventer, was part of 
the county of Hamaland. Regino, abbot of Prüm, identifies Eberhard Saxo as 
its contemporary count in his early-tenth-century Chronicon.44 Eberhard was a 
Carolingian ally based in Zutphen, which may have provided Deventer, some 
fifteen kilometres downstream, with a measure of military protection against 
Scandinavian aggression.45 Despite this advantage, the annals report for 882 
that ‘the Northmen burned the port called in the Frisian tongue Deventer’.46 
The attack on Deventer, the motives for which are discussed below, prompted 
the Carolingians to hastily construct fortifications around both Deventer 
and Zutphen, which was likely also attacked during the same expedition.47 
This hurried response, which Dorestad had previously been denied, strongly 
suggests that Deventer had become an investment the Carolingians would 
rather not part with, possibly because it was now one of only few significant 
trade settlements in and around Frisia they had direct control over. 
Apart from its economic expansion, Deventer also became Frisia’s 
principal ecclesiastical centre; the bishop of Utrecht, having been forced to flee 
his seat following the Viking attack of 857, returned to the diocese during the 
late 880s or early 890s, residing in Deventer.48 The apparent baptism of Rorik 
39 Bartels 2006, 26; Verwers 2010, 63.
40 Sarfatij 1999, 273.
41 Verwers 2010, 63.
42 Verhulst 2000, 114.
43 Van Es 1990, 171. 
44 Chronicle of Regino, 184, 193, 223.
45 Bartels 2006, 209.
46 Annals of Fulda, 93-94.
47 Päffgen 2004, 95-96.
48 Van Vliet 2004, 147. Charter evidence confirms the continued attendance of Bishops Hunger 
of Utrecht and his successor, Odilbald, at royal assemblies in the Carolingian heartlands 
between the 860s and 880s, suggesting their absence from the diocese but continued 
influence on royal affairs. See Oorkondenboek Sticht Utrecht, 79-80, 91.
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during the 860s would have been a favourable development for the Utrecht 
church, and reprimanding correspondence from archbishop Hincmar of Reims 
to the Dane suggests that a degree of local clerical presence and influence 
had already been restored at that time.49 With Utrecht itself apparently still 
in ruins following a raid in 881, Deventer was selected as an alternative 
residence from which to regain control of the area.50 Subsequently, the town 
became both commercially and ecclesiastically dominant, a combination not 
before achieved by either Dorestad or Utrecht. An 896 charter confirms the 
transfer to Deventer of economic privileges the church had formerly enjoyed 
in Dorestad.51 
The Carolingian design for Deventer and Tiel is also evident from a late-
ninth-century charter, mentioning local appearances of royal officials, possibly 
having moved their office from deteriorating Dorestad.52 New royal toll 
stations were established in both Tiel and Deventer as merchants increasingly 
frequented these settlements.53 At this point, Dorestad had already disappeared 
from record, its economic faculties fully adopted by newly thriving emporia.
Controlled Decline
Having discussed the circumstances of Dorestad’s decline, the 
simultaneous advancement of nearby emporia, and possible advantages of 
these developments to Carolingian rulers, no great stretch of the imagination 
is required to assume that these events were partially or wholly orchestrated. If 
so, Lothar would have willingly ‘let go’ of an already economically weakened 
Dorestad to keep foreign invaders at bay, whilst simultaneously encouraging 
economic growth outside the Danish benefice by actively transferring 
royal and ecclesiastical offices to Deventer and Tiel. Hence, the subsequent 
terminal recession of Dorestad, rendered economically useless even to Danish 
vassals, may also have been part of this design. This controlled decline made 
Carolingian rulers more determined to develop and fortify nearby emporia, 
which they had more immediate control over. Meanwhile, trade continued 
and the Frankish hinterlands, paramount to the functioning of the kingdom, 
remained relatively safe. 
As the Danes became Carolingian vassals in Frisia, they made little 
attempt to colonise their benefices, possibly due to contemporary commitments 
49 Milis 2005, 68.
50 Annals of Fulda, 90; Päffgen 2004, 84-85.
51 These rights also seem to have applied to Tiel and other settlements subject to the Utrecht 
Church, see Diplomata Belgica, 327.
52 Oorkondenboek Sticht Utrecht, 94-96.
53 Sarfatij 1999, 268.
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in Anglo-Saxon England, the Irish Sea Area and Normandy. Their motives 
concerning Frisia seem to have been mainly exploitative.54 Upon initially 
receiving Dorestad, Rorik may have believed his benefice to be a lucrative 
prize. However, there are indications that the Danes soon realised their bounty 
was being rapidly drained of all economic potential. Although Dorestad’s 
Carolingian mint ceased official production during the 840s, local minting 
still seems to have continued up to 855.55 The final generations of locally 
minted coinage contain variously corrupt versions of both Lothar’s name and 
the mint name, where this was much rarer before.56 The distinct contrast in 
workmanship suggests that the Dorestad issuers were apparently none too 
skilled or concerned with the accuracy of their reproductions.57 Evaluating 
the evidence, it seems warranted to conclude that these coins represent 
Scandinavian attempts at forgery to keep the local economy functioning. Van 
Es suggests that local Danish vassals were inept at controlling Dorestad’s 
economic operation and would have probably sped up its decline rather than 
halt it.58 
Dorestad’s disappearance was followed by renewed aggression 
throughout Frisia during the late 870s and 880s. The annals report that 
Nijmegen, Utrecht and Deventer were all attacked between 880 and 882.59 
As these attacks seem to have occurred relatively soon after Dorestad’s final 
breath, the current or previous Scandinavian vassals of the former emporium, 
frustrated by its economic devaluation, may have questioned their fealty 
and condoned such hostilities. As mentioned above, the attack on Deventer 
prompted the erection of its fortifications and those of nearby Zutphen. The 
effectiveness of these defences thwarted the use of surprise attacks, causing the 
Vikings to increasingly turn their attention southwards, towards the Scheldt 
region.60 Subsequent raids there are similarly thought to have instigated the 
construction of settlement fortifications.61 This defensive strategy ultimately 
proved effective in securing Carolingian economic assets throughout the Low 
54 Coupland 1995, 199. 
55 Van Gelder 1961, 40-41.
56 Both Lothar’s ‘temple’-coinage and subsequent issues have been found to contain 
corruptions. The reading IOTAMVS IPNEIRAT instead of HLOTHARIVS IMPERA is 
common, for example. See Coupland 1988, 18, 23-24; Grierson 2006, 223-224.
57 Coupland 2010, 102.
58 Van Es 1990, 169.
59 Annals of Fulda, 89, 90, 92.
60 Van Es 1994, 115.
61 In coastal Zeeland, a region particularly vulnerable to further incursion, palisaded ring-
forts were built to ward off Viking raiders during the final decades of the ninth century. See 
Van Heeringen 1995, 15-39. Contemporary defences were possibly also established near 
current Leiden (South Holland) and at Aalburg (North Brabant), among others. See Van 
Vliet 2004, 145.
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Countries against further Scandinavian incursion. Dorestad, a mere shadow 
of its former self, was returned into Frisian hands around 885, not to re-emerge 
as a town of significance for many generations.62
Conclusion
Dorestad’s rapid growth up to the mid-ninth century can be attributed 
to a combination of favourable environmental, political and cultural 
circumstances.63 Despite being subject to Frankish rule and protection, the 
emporium became a preferred target of Scandinavian raiders during the 
830s. The wars between Louis the Pious and his progeny had politically 
weakened the Carolingian Empire, which opportunistic Scandinavians gladly 
seem to have taken advantage of.64 The initial attacks on Frisia, like those in 
Normandy and the British Isles, seem to have been exploratory. A series of 
more coordinated attacks started during the 830s as the newly developed 
urban culture of the Rhinelands took a severe blow.65 Nautically superior, 
the Scandinavians overwhelmed the Frisian coastal defences and attacked 
its commercial centres, devastating Dorestad four times in four consecutive 
years.66 Despite continual rebuilding efforts, the emporium sank into gradual 
economic depression. Political disorder, Viking incursion and a migrating 
river represent the most commonly proposed theories to explain this decline, 
which resulted in Dorestad’s eventual disappearance during the 870s. 
This paper has attempted to characterise the emporium’s abandonment 
as a less clear-cut development by proposing it represented the initial phase 
of a Carolingian design to actively retain control of Frisian commerce, 
whilst simultaneously using Scandinavian vassalage to secure the Rhenish 
heartlands. Purposely relinquishing Dorestad to the Danes, the Carolingians 
were still able to reap its lucrative yet withering rewards through tolls 
and other taxes. Slowly, the axis of Frisian commerce shifted eastwards as 
Rhenish merchants moved their business to nearby Deventer and Tiel, towns 
more directly controlled by the Carolingians. Their mobility allowed these 
merchants to continue their trading activities elsewhere with relatively little 
hindrance.67 As both Deventer and Tiel gradually appropriated Dorestad’s 
commercial attributes, the Danes seem to have fruitlessly attempted to sustain 
its local trade, manifest in their forging of Carolingian coinage. Desperation 
62 Van Es 1994, 117.
63 Willemsen 2012, 67.
64 Eickhoff 2004, 54.
65 Päffgen 2004, 108.
66 Eickhoff 2004, 54.
67 Ellmers 1985, 91.
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Map of locations mentioned in the text – Early Medieval Low Countries. Adapted from 
Heidinga 1997, 2, with kind permission from the cartographer (Bert Brousenstijn, Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam).
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may have eventually led to defiance as new waves of Viking raids soon 
followed Dorestad’s decline into obscurity. However, the Carolingians were 
quick to respond this time, building numerous fortifications throughout 
the Low Countries, successfully preserving regional commerce through its 
newly allocated nuclei. Focusing their efforts on southward settlements, the 
Vikings eventually entrenched themselves in continental politics as they 
received the Duchy of Normandy as vassals in 911.68 Lessons may have been 
learnt from dealing with the Danes at Dorestad, as the Norman benefice was 
likewise brought about to pacify the assailants and preserve the economic and 
defensive capabilities of the West Frankish heartlands up the River Seine.69 
The Normandy fiefdom was a permanent development, which the Frisian 
benefice might also conceivably have been, were it not for the gradual seepage 
of all economic potential from Dorestad. 
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